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There is clear evidence that during 1980-90 more exports are positively associated with higher growth rates across Chinese cities. In comparison, in the late 1980s, the contribution to growth comes mainly from foreign investment. The contribution of foreign investment comes in the form of technological and managerial spillover across firms as opposed to an infusion of new capital. Finally, there is nothing magical about the high growth rates of Chinese coastal areas other than their effective utilization of foreign investment and exports.

This paper studies the connection between the growth of non-state firms and the speed of closing down state-owned firms in transition economies.

A "naturally more open economy"--As determined by its size and geography - devotes more resources to building good institutions and displays less corruption.

This paper offers a new interpretation of the connection between openness and good governance. Assuming that corruption and bad governance drive out international trade and investment more than domestic trade and investment, a naturally more open economy' as determined by its size and geography would devote more resources to building good institutions and would display lower corruption in equilibrium. In data, naturally more open economies' do exhibit less corruption even after taking into account their levels of development. Residual openness' which potentially includes trade policies is found not to be important once natural openness' is accounted for. Moreover, naturally more open economies' also tend to pay better civil servant salaries relative to their private sector alternatives indicative of the marginal benefit of good governance in a society's revealed preference. These patterns are consistent with the conceptual model.

"State-owned financial institutions have been proposed as a way to address market failure, but the recent literature has also highlighted their pathological problems. This paper studies the case of China for pitfalls of a state-dominated financial system, including possible segmentation of the internal capital market due to local government interference and mis-allocation of capital. Even without formal legal prohibition to capital movement across regions, we find that capital mobility within China is low. Furthermore, to the extent some capital moves around the country, the government (as opposed to the private sector) tends to allocate capital systematically away from more productive regions toward less productive ones. In this context, a smaller role of the government in the financial sector might increase economic efficiency and the rate of economic growth"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

This paper examines the role of corruption in the design of monetary policies for developing countries in a framework of fiscal and monetary interaction and obtains several interesting results. First, pegged exchange rates, currency boards, or dollarization, while often prescribed as a solution to the problem of a lack of credibility for developing countries, is typically not credible in countries with serious corruption. Second, the optimal degree of conservatism for a Rogoff (1985)-type central banker is an inverse function of the corruption level. Third, either an optimally designed inflation target or an optimal-conservative central banker is preferable to an exchange rate peg, currency board, or dollarization.

While new conventional wisdom warns that developing countries should be aware of the risks of premature capital account liberalization, the costs of not removing exchange controls have received much less attention. This paper investigates the negative effects of exchange controls on trade. To minimize evasion of controls, countries often intensify inspections at the border and increase documentation requirements. Thus, the cost of conducting trade rises. The paper finds that a one standard-deviation increase in the controls on trade payment has the same negative effect on trade as an increase in tariff by about 14 percentage points. A one standard-deviation increase in the controls on FX transactions reduces trade by the same amount as a rise in tariff by 11 percentage points. Therefore, the collateral damage in terms of foregone trade is sizable.