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This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.

First published in 1934, this book explores prominent economic questions on the subject of rearmament and disarmament. Both rearmament and disarmament have a number of economic advantages and disadvantages and in each chapter Paul Einzig considers these in order to decide on which side the advantages outweigh the disadvantages. Part I of the book examines the economics of armament in the light of real experience of recent history whilst Part II looks to the probable economic effort of future rearmament.

First published in 1933, this book looks at the key events relating to the fluctuations of sterling that surrounded the suspension of the gold standard in September 1931. It explores the idea that monetary authorities receive more recognition and admiration for their work from those abroad than those at home, whether well deserved or not. Indeed, after the economic episodes of September 1931, many people on the Continent regarded everything that happened to the pound as being the result of a carefully planned and executed monetary policy. Here, the author argues that the praise of British authorities from abroad was undeserved and that in actual fact, the behaviours of the monetary authorities in the aftermath of September 1931 were unsophisticated. This book describes the events following the pound’s collapse as having all the ups and downs of a comedy.

First published in 1933, the original purpose of this book was to draw attention to the international aspects of monetary policy and to put forward the case for international co-operation in the monetary sphere. Paul Einzig highlights the negative impact that a lack of international spirit in monetary policy can have and promotes an increased understanding amongst nations. He discusses the failure of the Monetary and Economic Conference of June-July 1933 and expresses his belief that the monetary crisis of the time could have been solved, if not through an agreement, then through the inevitable inflationary effect of the increasing economic difficulties.