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We use firm-level data from 10 European countries to establish several new stylized facts about firms’ labor market power. First, we find the pervasive presence of labor market power across countries and sectors, measured by average and median markdowns above unity. Second, focusing on the dynamics, we find that weighted average markdowns have increased 1.3 percent between 2000 and 2017. However, median and unweighted average markdowns have actually decreased over the same time period, suggesting the existence of divergent paths across the markdown distribution. Third, we show that high-markdown firms tend to have a large footprint in both their product and input (labor) markets, and are most commonly listed and found among services sectors. Finally, a Melitz-Polanec decomposition of the change in weighted average markdown finds that the increase has been driven by a reallocation of resources towards high-markdown incumbents and by the extensive margin via the net entry of high-markdown firms while, in contrast, there was a decline in within-firm markdowns. Our findings highlight the importance of using granular and broad-based data for a thorough analysis of firms’ labor market power.

While standard demand factors perform well in predicting historical trade patterns, they fail conspicuously in 2020, when pandemic-specific factors played a key role above and beyond demand. Prediction errors from a multilateral import demand model in 2020 vary systematically with the health preparedness of trade partners, suggesting that pandemic-response policies have international spillovers. Bilateral product-level data covering about 95 percent of global goods trade reveals sizable negative international spillovers to trade from supply disruptions due to domestic lockdowns. These international spillovers accounted for up to 60 percent of the observed decline in trade in the early phase of the pandemic, but their effect was shortlived, concentrated among goods produced in key global value chains, and mitigated by the availability of remote working and the size of the fiscal response to the pandemic.

While the level of disparities across regions in 10 advanced European economies studied in this paper mostly reflects productivity gaps, the increase since the Great Recession has resulted from diverging unemployment rates. Following the pandemic, this could be further exacerbated given teleworkability rates are lower in poorer regions than in high-income regions, making them ex-ante more vulnerable to the pandemic’s likely material impact on the prevalence of remote work. Preliminary evidence from 2020 confirms that regional disparities between countries increased during 2020. A further concern is that the pandemic might accelerate the automation of jobs across Europe, something which often happens following recessions. While lagging regions have lower ex-ante vulnerabilities against the routinization, the transformation of jobs through sectors with higher routinization rates in these regions could increase their vulnerability to technological change over time. The green transition could also lead to challenges for regions that have benefitted from carbon-intensive growth strategies. Finally, the paper discusses the role for policies—including placed-based ones—in reducing disparities in the face of the aforementioned short, medium, and long-term risks.