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This study quantifies the importance of a Global Financial Cycle (GFCy) for capital flows. We use capital flow data dis-aggregated by direction and type between 1990Q1 and 2015Q5 for 85 countries, and conventional techniques, models and metrics. Since the GFCy is an unobservable concept, we use two methods to represent it: directly observable variables in center economies often linked to it, such as the VIX; and indirect manifestations, proxied by common dynamic factors extracted from actual capital flows. Our evidence seems mostly inconsistent with a significant and conspicuous GFCy; both methods combined rarely explain more than a quarter of the variation in capital flows. Succinctly, most variation in capital flows does not seem to be the result of common shocks nor stem from observables in a central country like the United States.

We jointly estimate credit and fiscal multipliers in China. We use the tenure of the provincial party secretary, interacted with the type of stimulus used in other provinces, to obtain separate instruments for provincial credit and government expenditure. We estimate a fiscal multiplier of 0.8 and a credit multiplier of 0.2 in 2001-2015. The multipliers have changed over time. The fiscal multiplier has increased from 0.75 in 2001-2008 to 1.4 in 2010-2015. The credit multiplier has declined from 0.17 to zero over the same periods. Our results suggest that reducing credit growth in China is unlikely to disrupt output growth, whereas fiscal policy may be effective in supporting macroeconomic adjustment.

Commodity-based sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) have been at a crossroads following the recent fall in commodity prices. This paper provides a framework for commodity-based SWF management, focusing on stabilization and savings funds, by (i) examining macrofiscal linkages for SWFs; (ii) presenting an integrated sovereign asset and liability management (SALM) approach to SWF management; and (iii) applying this framework to a scenario where assets are being accumulated and to a scenario where the SWF is drawn on to cover a financing gap due to lower commodity prices.

Does inflation help improve public finances? This paper documents the dynamic responses of fiscal variables to an inflation shock, using both quarterly and annual panel data for a broad set of economies. Inflation shocks are estimated to improve fiscal balances temporarily, as nominal revenues track inflation closely, while nominal primary expenditures take longer to catch up. Inflation spikes also lead to a persistent reduction in debt to GDP ratios, both due to the primary balance improvement and the nominal GDP denominator channel. However, debt only falls with inflation surprises—rises in inflation expectations do not improve debt dynamics, suggesting limits to debt debasement strategies. The results are robust to using various inflation measures and instrumental variables.

Nominal wage growth in most advanced economies remains markedly lower than it was before the Great Recession of 2008–09. This paper finds that the bulk of the wage slowdown is accounted for by labor market slack, inflation expectations, and trend productivity growth. In particular, there appears to be greater slack than meets the eye. Involuntary part-time employment appears to have weakened wage growth even in economies where headline unemployment rates are now at, or below, their averages in the years leading up to the recession.

This paper revisits the issue of cross-country spillovers from fiscal consolidations using an innovative empirical methodology. We find evidence in support of fiscal spillovers in 10 euro area countries. Fiscal consolidation in one country not only reduces domestic output (direct effect), but also the output of other member countries (indirect/spillover effect). Fiscal spillovers are larger for: (i) more closely located and economically integrated countries, and (ii) fiscal shocks originating from relatively larger countries. On average, 1 percent of GDP fiscal consolidation in 10 euro area countries reduces the combined output by 0.6 percent on impact, out of which half is driven by indirect effects from fiscal spillovers. The impact peters out and becomes insignificant over the medium-term. It is largely driven by tax measures, which have a relatively stronger effect on output compared to expenditure measures. The results are robust to alternative measures of bilateral links across countries.

Asia and China made disproportionate contributions to the slowdown of global trade growth in 2015. China’s import growth slowed starkly, driven by both external and domestic factors, including a rebalancing of demand. Econometric results point to weak investment and rebalancing as the main causes of the import slowdown. Spillover effects from China’s rebalancing are estimated for some 60 countries using value-added trade data, and are found to be more negative on Asia and commodity exporters than others.

The perception that inflation dynamics in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are driven by supply shocks implies a limited role for monetary policy in influencing inflation in the short run. SSA’s rapid growth, its integration with the global economy, changes in the policy frameworks, among others, in the last decade suggest that the drivers of inflation may have changed. We quantitatively analyze inflation dynamics in SSA using a Global VAR model, which incorporates trade and financial linkages among economies, as well as the role of regional and global demand and inflationary spillovers. We find that in the past 25 years, the main drivers of inflation have been domestic supply shocks and shocks to exchange rate and monetary variables; but that, in recent years, the contribution of these shocks to inflation has fallen. Domestic demand pressures as well as global shocks, and particularly shocks to output, however, have played a larger role in driving inflation over the last decade. We also show that country characteristics matter—the extent of oil and food imports, vulnerability to weather shocks, economic importance of agriculture, trade openness and policy regime, among others, help in explaining the role of shocks.

We reconsider the macroeconomic implications of public investment efficiency, defined as the ratio between the actual increment to public capital and the amount spent. We show that, in a simple and standard model, increases in public investment spending in inefficient countries do not have a lower impact on growth than in efficient countries, a result confirmed in a simple cross-country regression. This apparently counter-intuitive result, which contrasts with Pritchett (2000) and recent policy analyses, follows directly from the standard assumption that the marginal product of public capital declines with the capital/output ratio. The implication is that efficiency and scarcity of public capital are likely to be inversely related across countries. It follows that both efficiency and the rate of return need to be considered together in assessing the impact of increases in investment, and blanket recommendations against increased public investment spending in inefficient countries need to be reconsidered. Changes in efficiency, in contrast, have direct and potentially powerful impacts on growth: “investing in investing” through structural reforms that increase efficiency, for example, can have very high rates of return.

The reform of energy subsidies is an important but challenging issue for sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. There is a relatively large theoretical and empirical literature on this issue. While this paper relies on that literature, too, it tailors its discussion to SSA countries to respond to the following questions: Why it is important to reduce energy subsidies? What are the difficulties involved in energy subsidy reform? How best can a subsidy reform be implemented? This paper uses various sources of information on SSA countries: quantitative assessments, surveys, and individual (but standardized) case studies.