A Post-Kuhnian Philosophy of Science
Professor Michael Friedman of Stanford University is famous for his interpretation of Kant's writings on space, time mathematics and physics, but his philosophical aims are wider, as indicated by the title of a recent book dedicated to his work: Discourse on a New Method: Reinvigorating the Marriage of History and Philosophy of Science (Open Court, 2010). The two Spinoza Lectures presented here belong to Friedman's ongoing project of articulating a post-Kuhnian philosophy of science. Friedman's approach, like Kuhn's, is essentially historical, and builds on a careful depiction of the development of the mathematical and physical sciences in the Western tradition. By embedding these developments within a wider narrative depicting their complex relations to a parallel set of developments in what he calls scientifi c philosophy, however, Friedman aims to provide a more adequate philosophical response to the conceptual incommensurability between succeeding Kuhnian paradigms that arises in the great scientifi c revolutions that have defi ned this tradition. Encouraged by Kuhn's own description of his approach as Kantianism with movable categories, moreover, Friedman endeavors to develop a neo-Kantian approach to the problems concerning scientifi c rationality that have affl icted the history, philosophy, and sociology of science since Kuhn; in particular, by constructing a narrative depicting how our present situation results, among other things, from successive conceptual transformations of Kant's original approach. In the course of these two lectures, Professor Friedman expands the scope of his original project by proceeding temporally backwards into the scientifi c revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that preceded Kant, and by proceeding culturally outwards so as to include social, institutional, and technological developments along with purely intellectual developments.--