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The scope of any Supply Chain management strategy usually takes into account the few single echelons directly linked to the process of interest (raw materials acquisition, market distribution,...) which are assumed to present a previously known behaviour (even this behaviour may include some uncertainty). Decisions based on this limited picture disregard the important information associated to the interaction among different cooperative SCs. This work aims to optimize the overall performance of several SC's in a cooperative scenario acting as an “entire SC”. Accordingly, the main features of this entire SC (raw materials SC, production-distribution SC, products and wastes) have been considered. The approach is demonstrated using a case study which integrates an energy poligeneration SC model (RM acquisition, and different production systems in a competitive situation) and the traditional production-distribution SC model (RM acquisition, distribution to production plants, production, and distribution to markets) in a mixed integer non-linear programming model.

Current Supply chain (Se) decision support tools are devoted to the optimization of one objective function from a bias centralized perspective, without considering the coexistence with other participants and their uncertain conditions. Towards multi-enterprise-wide coordination (M-EWC), the aim of this thesis is to contribute to PSE by new decision support tools able to achieve global coordination/collaboration with all organizations participating in large-scale chemical SCs systems. Different approaches are proposed in this thesis to capture the interaction between the enterprises of contrasting and competitive goals considering the role of the uncertainty of each participant on the decision-making of the other participants. The first contribution of this thesis is to achieve global coordination with the supporting enterprises (third parties). A global coordination framework is developed to integrate the third parties decisions as full SCs in the decision-making process of a large-scale multi-product se of multiple echelons. A generic coordinated tactical model is developed to highlight the interaction between the se of interest and the third parties SCs. A comparison is undertaken between the proposed coordinated approach and the traditional non-coordinated approach to highlight its potential on the tactical decision-making and the resource consumption. The second contribution of this thesis is to highlight the role of the third parties as business partners through pricing on the economic performance of the global coordinated system. The coordination framework proposed in the above mentioned paragraph is extended to integrate the third parties price policies as degree of freedom decisions in the coordinated se tactical model. Third different approaches to approximate the third parties price policies variations are proposed and compared based on the average and discounting trends built on the demand elasticity theory. The consequences of using the proposed pricing approximation models on the global coordination, regarding not only their effect on the tactical decisions, but also the additional complexity in the mathematical formulations to be solved, are analyzed and compared. Fourth, the inter-organizational coordination between the interacting enterprises is achieved based on cooperative and non-cooperative systems. The decisions obtained from the cooperative, non-cooperative, and standalone systems are analyzed and compared. Fifth, a non-cooperative non-zero-sum Scenario-Based Dynamic Negotiation (SBDN) approach, with non-symmetrical roles, is proposed to set the best conditions for the coordination/collaboration contracts between enterprises of contrasting objectives participating as full SCs in a large-scale multi-enterprise multi-product SC. Under the leadership of the manufacturer, the uncertain reaction of the follower partner resulted from the uncertain behavior of its se third parties is considered in the leader model as a probability of acceptance. Sixth, an evaluation methodology is proposed to evaluate the negotiation outcome based on the probability distributions taking into consideration the variability of the follower profits successful scenarios and risk behavior. The final contribution of this thesis is developing an integrated game theory approach for inter-organizational coordination. A non-cooperative non-zero-sum Stackelberg game is developed to capture the contrasting goals under different uncertain and competitive circumstances. The competition between the Stackelberg game players and the counterpart third parties is modeled through Nash Equilibrium game. Later in this document, a Stackelberg set of Pareto frontiers is obtained, where each point corresponds to possible expected win-win coordination contract. Finally, a comparison is undertaken between the coordination contracts resulted from this integrated game theory and the SBDN approach under the same circumstances.