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In the World Library of Psychologists series, international experts themselves present career-long collections of what they judge to be their finest pieces - extracts from books, key articles, salient research findings, and their major theoretical and practical contributions. Jonathan St B T Evans is amongst the foremost cognitive psychologists of his generation, having been influential in spearheading developments in the psychological study of reasoning from its very beginnings in the 1970s up to the present day. This volume of self-selected papers recognises Professor Evan’s major contribution to the psychological study of thinking and reasoning by bringing together his most influential and important works. Early selections in the book focus upon experimental studies of reasoning - matching bias in the Wason selection task, belief bias in syllogistic reasoning, and also seminal work on the understanding of conditional statements. The later selections include Evans’ work on more general forms of dual process and dual system theory, and his recent account of two minds in one brain. The volume also contains chapters which highlight Evans’ contribution to the topic of human rationality, and also his influence on the development of the "new paradigm" in the psychology of reasoning. The key developments in the psychology of reasoning are paralleled by those in Evans’s own intellectual history, and the book will therefore make essential reading for all researchers in the psychology of reasoning, and a wider audience of graduate and upper-level undergraduate students with an interest in reasoning and/or dual process theory.

Thinking is the essence of what it means to be human and defines us more than anything else as a species. Jonathan Evans explores cognitive psychological approaches to understanding the nature of thinking and reasoning, problem solving, and decision making.

This volume is a state-of-the-art survey of the psychology of reasoning, based around, and in tribute to, one of the fieldâe(tm)s most eminent figures: Jonathan St B.T. Evans. In this collection of cutting edge research, Evansâe(tm) collaborators and colleagues review a wide range of important and developing areas of inquiry. These include biases in thinking, probabilistic and causal reasoning, peopleâe(tm)s use of âe~ifâe(tm) sentences in arguments, the dual-process theory of thought, and the nature of human rationality. These foundational issues are examined from various angles and finally integrated in a concluding panoramic chapter written by Evans himself. The eighteen chapters, all written by leading international researchers, combine state-of the-art research with investigation into the most fundamental questions surrounding human mental life, such as: What is the architecture of the human mind? Are humans rational, and what is the nature of this rationality? How do we think hypothetically? The Science of Reason offers a unique combination of breadth, depth and integrative vision, making it an indispensable resource for researchers and students of human reason.

How to be a Researcher provides a strategic guide to the conduct of a successful research career within a university environment. Based on the author’s extensive personal experience, it offers down-to-earth advice, philosophical guidance, and discussions of the political context of academic research. This is not a research methods book, and the topics it covers are rarely discussed elsewhere. The bulk of the book provides practical advice on the development of essential skills and strategic approaches, covering questions such as: how to decide which topics to work on how to read and review literature how to develop theory how to integrate research and teaching activity how to approach research design how to obtain and manage research funding how to collaborate and supervise effectively how to write up your research, and how to secure the best sources of publication. The final part of the book considers the philosophy and psychology of research work and includes an exploration of the cognitive biases which may affect researchers. How to be a Researcher will be particularly useful for masters and doctoral students in the behavioral and social sciences, and also for early career academics developing research within a university career.

Using a recently developed theoretical framework called Hypothetical Thinking Theory, Jonathan St. B. T. Evans provides an integrated theoretical account of a wide range of psychological studies on hypothesis testing, reasoning, judgement and decision making.

Jonathan Evans presents a clear strategy for research. Drawing on examples, expertise and experience, he gives practical advice on all aspects of research for postgraduate researchers and those early in their career.

Addressing the apparent paradox in the psychology of thinking, this volume looks at the study of human rationality and argues that there is confusion between personal rationality and impersonal rationality.

Deductive reasoning is widely regarded as an activity central to human intelligence, and as such has attracted an increasing amount of psychological study in recent years. In this first major survey of the field for over a decade, the authors provide a detailed and balanced review of all the main kinds of deductive reasoning task studied by psychologists. Topics covered include conditional and disjunctive reasoning, the Wason selection task, relational inference and reasoning with syllogisms and quantifiers. Throughout the review, a careful distinction is drawn between the main empirical findings in the field and the major theoretical approaches proposed to account for these findings. Discussion of experimental findings is organized around three central questions: What is the extent and limitation of human competence in deductive reasoning? What factors are responsible for systematic errors and biases on reasoning tasks? How is human reasoning influenced by the content in which logical problems are presented? Four major classes of theory are discussed throughout the book. The long established theory that people have a mental logic comprised of formal rules of inference is contrasted particularly with the recently developed mental model theory of deductive reasoning. Explanations of many phenomena, especially biases, are also considered in terms of heuristic processes. Finally, consideration is given to accounts of content and context effects based upon the use of domain sensitive rules or schemas. The book ends with a discussion of research on deductive reasoning in the context of the current debate about human rationality.

Originally published in 1982, this was an extensive and up-to-date review of research into the psychology of deductive reasoning, Jonathan Evans presents an alternative theoretical framework to the rationalist approach which had dominated much of the published work in this field at the time. The review falls into three sections. The first is concerned with elementary reasoning tasks, in which response latency is the prime measure of interest. The second and third sections are concerned with syllogistic and propositional reasoning respectively, in which interest has focused on the explanation of frequently observed logical errors. In an extended discussion it is argued that reasoning processes are content specific, and give little indication of the operation of any underlying system of logical competence. Finally, a dual process theory of reasoning, with broad implications and connections with other fields of psychology, is elaborated and assessed in the light of recent evidence.

Originally published in 1982, this was an extensive and up-to-date review of research into the psychology of deductive reasoning, Jonathan Evans presents an alternative theoretical framework to the rationalist approach which had dominated much of the published work in this field at the time. The review falls into three sections. The first is concerned with elementary reasoning tasks, in which response latency is the prime measure of interest. The second and third sections are concerned with syllogistic and propositional reasoning respectively, in which interest has focused on the explanation of frequently observed logical errors. In an extended discussion it is argued that reasoning processes are content specific, and give little indication of the operation of any underlying system of logical competence. Finally, a dual process theory of reasoning, with broad implications and connections with other fields of psychology, is elaborated and assessed in the light of recent evidence.