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The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has come a long way since its inception as the European Security and Defence Identity under NATO. Yet more than a decade after emerging as an autonomous entity, with its own capacity for civilian crisis management and military action, the European Union's CSDP is still very much a work in progress. This fully revised and updated new edition provides the most comprehensive account available of the CSDP and the debates surrounding it. Written by a leading authority in the field, the second edition draws on the author's own extensive research in the area, including hundreds of interviews with key actors, and takes account of developments since the reforms of the Lisbon Treaty. A brand new chapter assesses international relations theory and European integration theory as tools to understand the CSDP, and critically engages with theoretical approaches that view security and defence policy as the exclusive domain of sovereign nation-states. The book concludes with an analysis of future hurdles for the European Union as it responds to new and often unpredictable crises across the globe.

Europeans on Europe offers an assessment of the hopes, fears, expectations and preparedness of Britain, France and Germany at the approach of the 1992 deadline. It examines both at the national and European level the three key areas of business and economics, foreign and defence policy, and politics and political culture, both country by country and in a comparative mode.

This book provides an up-to-date and comprehensive analysis by a leading authority of the EU's recent emergence as a security and defence actor and the implications for transatlantic relations.

Recoge: 1. Where is the CESDP coming from? - 2. Where is the CESDP project today? - 3. Where is the CESDP leading us? - Conclusions: CESDP in a new global order.

Filling a surprising gap in existing studies, this book addresses many of the unanswered questions surrounding the role of european integration in shaping national defence policy. The impressive array of contributors consider the pressures on state policy emanating from the process of integration. The book is divided into three distinct parts: * an outline of the tortuous history of attempts to link defence with European integration * a study of the four larger member states - France, Germany, Italy and the UK as well as a chapter on The Netherlands; * an analysis of the effects of the nuclear weapons and arms procurement policies. This, the second book in The State and the European Union series, sheds light on an increasingly important and topical aspect of contemporary European security and will be essential reading for those studying European Politics, Public Policy and International Relations.

The European Union is experiencing a new dynamic behind its quest for a credible security and defence capacity. New projects and mechanisms suggest a shift in European ambition. This paper assesses the reality of this new dynamic, arguing that the EU needs a clearly articulated grand strategy – outlining the objectives in the Southern and Eastern neighbourhoods, and tailoring those objectives to realistic means. Those means will range from high end assets to purely civilian assets. Defence spending will require structured Europeanisation. Involvement of third countries will require creative legal developments. EU-NATO relations must undergo fundamental revision. If ‘strategic autonomy’, the objective of the European Global Strategy, is to become a reality, it will involve the EU progressively assuming leadership within NATO, thereby meeting the calls across the United States for the allies to assume greater responsibility for their own affairs.

The author examines in this essay, two of the most fundamental debates that the Union, as an international actor, will have to clarify collectively in the coming months and years. First, is European defence the ultimate launch pad for greater political integration among the Union's member countries? Will the St-Malo process necessarily lead to a certain sharing of sovereignty in foreign policy and defence - which are above all traditionally a national preserve? Or, conversely, will defence be the ultimate safeguard against political integration to the extent that its intergovernmental regime will allow member states to maintain or even reinforce their national control over the functioning and orientation of the Union? Recent European debates on a federal Europe, the avant-garde, the hard core, the pioneer group, or whatever other formula may in future be adopted in connection with the effective operation of a Europe with thirty members, have so far very largely ignored the impact of defence on the Union's function and purpose. One of the great merits of this Chaillot Paper is that it has looked again at the debate on Europe's political objective in the light of the both recent and spectacular advances that have been made in the field of defence. The author is in little doubt that, despite all the hesitation and contortions among member states that can be foreseen, the inclusion of defence in the European Union's general competencies will also, in the medium term, give extra impetus to the process of integration. Second, does a specifically European way of managing security issues exist? In the face of a given crisis, will the Europeans do the same thing as other international organisations or individual states, using only European means, or does there exist in the practice, culture and functioning of the Union an irreducible added value that will profoundly modify the actual concept and the practice of crisis management?

Since the publication of the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) in June 2016, there have been innumerable calls for the re-launch of the EU's much misunderstood Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). One can call this CSDP-redux. What is the objective behind this renewed energy?

This book, first published in 1984, examines France’s independent nuclear weapons programme of the 1980s alongside the French peace movement, which was almost totally absent – in contrast to the peace protests of the US and the rest of Europe. This book analyses this unusual pattern of defence and dissent, and assesses its likely development. It looks at the evolvement of French post-war defence policy, and discusses the French peace movement, attempting to explain why it was so weak.

This report is the second in a series on thefuture of European defence following thepublication in April of a study on France. 1 It wasinformed by more than 40 in-depth interviewswith present and past German, European andNATO policymakers, members of parliament, serving and retired military officers, strategists, diplomats and defence industry executives. The interviews were conducted in personor by telephone between May and July2017, before the German general electionon 24 September 2017. While a handful ofserving officials were willing to be quoted byname, numerous policymakers, soldiers anddiplomats who gave generously of their timeand insights cannot be identified because ofthe sensitivity of their roles. I am particularly grateful to the Federal Ministry of Defence, the German representations to NATO and theEU, and the NATO press service for their helpand support. In addition, I drew on the programmes and speeches of the main candidates in the 2017Bundestag elections and their parties, media interviews with some senior figures who were1 Crunch Time - France and the Future of European Defence - Friends of Europe, April 2017(frnds.eu/frenchsecurity)not available for interview, the defence whitepaper produced by the German government in2016, the regular reports of the parliamentary commissioner for the armed forces, andspecialised reports by the ministries of economyand defence and the German internal securityagency covering arms exports, the availabilityof equipment to the Bundeswehr and cybersecurity and espionage against Germany, aswell as the proceedings of a conference onFranco-German defence cooperation held inMarch 2017 in Berlin by Friends of Europe andthe Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. In parallel, Friends of Europe conducted amultiple-choice survey of senior security anddefence experts in government, business andinternational organisations, NGOs and themedia. The findings of the survey are appendedto this report (see Annex B).I would like to express special thanks to twoelder statesmen of the German diplomatic andinternational security establishment, Joachim Bitterlich and Wolfgang Ischinger, who openedtheir doors, archives and contacts booksENGermany and the future of European defence 11generously to me. Hans-Peter Bartels, theparliamentary commissioner for the armedforces, was most helpful. Many people in thethink-tank community and the media sharedvaluable information, analysis and perspectives, of whom only a handful are named in thebody of the text. My thanks to Sophia Besch, Judy Dempsey, Janis Emmanouilidis, BastianGiegerich, Francois Heisbourg, Josef Joffe, Karl-Heinz Kamp, Daniel Keohane, John Kornblum, Barbara Kunz, Almut Moeller, Christian Moelling, Jana Puglierin, Daniela Schwarzer, Alison Smale, Constanze Stelzenmueller, Jan Techau, Nathalie Tocci, Thomas Valasek and Stefanie Weiss. At Friends of Europe, I am grateful to Geert Cami, Co-Founder and Managing Director, foroffering me the opportunity to write this study;to Skaiste Masalaityte, Programme Assistant, for her precious research assistance, conductand analysis of the stakeholder survey andsupport in arranging many of the interviews; toPauline Massart, who was Deputy Director forSecurity & Geopolitics when I began workingon the report and gave me precious stimulation;to Dharmendra Kanani, for encouraging meto focus more on the EU policy context; andto Giles Merritt, Founder and Chairman, forchallenging me to dig deeper, and for sharinghis many contacts. Joachim Bitterlich, Jamie Shea, PaulineMassart and Constanze Stelzenmueller kindlyagreed to review the first draft and contributedhelpful suggestions. Needless to say, the viewsexpressed here, and any errors, are mine andnot theirs. Finally, I wish to thank my former Reuterscolleagues in Germany, Andreas Rinke, Sabine Siebold and Noah Barkin, for sharinggenerously their deep knowledge of Chancellor Merkel's world view, German defence andsecurity policy, the Bundeswehr and thedefence industry.