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Given the Ukraine crisis, Russia’s resurgence and the burning crises in the South there has never been a better time to discuss European defence. From November 2014 to March 2015, the online magazine European Geostrategy published a number of excellent essays on the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), all from a national perspective. You can now read all of the essays in this one neat publication. Indeed, in this essay collection jointly published by European Geostrategy, the Egmont Institute and the Institute for European Studies, a host of leading experts give their national perspectives on the present state and future of the EU’s CSDP. Each of the thirty-four essays focuses on the continued relevance of the CSDP when compared to the security challenges facing Europe today. Some essays give a bleak picture of the future, whereas others see grounds for optimism. Either way the essays are bound to provoke reactions of all kinds.

Abstract: Medium altitude, long endurance drones are becoming a component of regular air forces. However, the extent to which manned aircraft are being replaced by such "MALE UAVs" (MALE = Medium Altitude, Long Endurance, UAV = Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) remains unclear. At present Germany is faced with determining with what means the Luftwaffe should be equipped in the medium term (up to 2020) and long-term (post-2020). Beyond military considerations, there are cooperation and industrial policy issues to be taken into account, since no one individual state in Europe can or wants to provide the financial means to develop a national MALE UAV model. Although European industry has already launched research and development projects, their governments are by no means on board. Likewise it is also unclear whether drones are to be armed in future. Discussion has been continuing for some time as to how far targeted killings are responsible and permissible. In contrast, no fundamental debate has so far

ABSTRACT. The European Commission’s initiatives in the field of armament should lead to a deeper integration of European DTIBs in the coming years. In parallel, the links between European and American DTIBs take the form of technological and armament cooperation, and of capital links between European or American companies. This report aims at analysing the links between the US DTIB and the EU DTIB, and the consequences these links carry on cooperation between European DTIBs. These links vary by country. France has strived to preserve its strategic autonomy when developing its DTIB. Its technological and capability-related reliance on the United States has thus remained limited. Nonetheless, cooperation is sought when it is mutually beneficial while French companies seek to invest in the US market, as do other European DTIBs.The German DTIB was rebuilt belatedly after World War II, partly on the basis ofFrench-German cooperation. German industry is now privatised and the scope of the German DTIB’s partnerships has widened to other European countries and to the US. The German supply chain is now well established in American armament programmes. The ItalianDTIB has consistently pursued a policy of active cooperation, whether with the US or with EU member states. Links with the US have notably been built in the context of NATO and through bilateral agreements. In parallel, Italy has developed partnerships with European countries. Rome’s cooperation policy is thus inclusive, and has considered diverse factors such as political links, capability requirements, the need to develop certain technologies and to preserve industrial capabilities and jobs in Italy.The British DTIB has historically enjoyed deeper links with US industry, as a result of the cultural closeness between the UK and the US, and of the strategic proximity that dates back to the end of World War II. The links between US and UK DTIBs thus follow a model of strategic partnership. Nevertheless, the UK’s industrial and defence policy is also pursued within a European framework. The missile manufacturer MBDA is nowadays considered as the deepest model of transnational industrial and defence integration in Europe.While Sweden seeks to preserve its industrial capabilities in two sectors –submarines and military aircraft –it appears to be most technologically reliant on the US among the surveyed countries. It is worth noting also that these links are long-standing, dating back to the cold war and the Soviet threat, despite Sweden not being a NATO member state.

Abstract: Security policy White Papers perform several functions. They serve to inform the German Bundestag and the German public, outline the Federal Government's security policy priorities with other countries, especially Germany's most important partners, and assist communication within the Bundeswehr. The White Paper 2016 is the first of its kind since 2006 and upholds this tradition. Its authors seek to redefine Germany's current and future security policy based on events and developments such as the global financial crisis, financial turmoil in the euro area, the suspension of conscription in Germany, upheavals in the Middle East and Russia's annexation of the Crimea. The Federal Government aims to inform the public and its allies in NATO and the EU precisely what the intentions of its security policy are. However, the contours of the Bundeswehr itself and its future remain blurred. The White Paper process, as it is known, was founded on the expectation of being able to openly and publ

Zusammenfassung: Nach einem Jahr Reformdebatte, angestoßen und lange Zeit getrieben vom Druck der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise, stehen 2011 die sicherheitspolitischen und strukturellen Entscheidungen für die Zukunft der Bundeswehr an. Dazu liegen erste Vorschläge aus dem Verteidigungsministerium auf dem Tisch. Diskutiert werden drei miteinander zusammenhängende Themen: erstens die Aussetzung der Wehrpflicht und die damit einhergehende Nachwuchs- und Rekrutierungsproblematik, zweitens die strukturelle Anpassung der Bundeswehr und des Ministeriums und schließlich drittens die Wahrnehmung dieser Veränderungen im Konzert der Streitkräftereformen unserer europäischen Partner. Was den letzten Punkt betrifft, muss die Perspektive auf eine gezielte europäische Kooperationsstrategie ausgeweitet werden: den Europäischen Imperativ. Zwar bietet die öffentliche Debatte über all diese kritischen Themen allein noch keine Garantie für das Gelingen der nationalen Reform, vor allem die Schaffung effizienter Streitkräfte und ihre Verankerung im internationalen Rahmen. Die Analyse der Reformdebatte kann jedoch helfen, die Erfolgsbedingungen für eine Bundeswehr zu definieren, die zu mehr europäischer Kooperation fähig ist