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This testimony discusses our past work examining the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) progress and efforts in planning, developing, and deploying its global nuclear detection architecture (GNDA). The overall mission of the GNDA is to use an integrated system of radiation detection equipment and interdiction activities to combat nuclear smuggling in foreign countries, at the U.S. border, and inside the United States. Terrorists smuggling nuclear or radiological material into the United States could use these materials to make an improvised nuclear device or a radiological dispersal device (also called a "dirty bomb"). The detonation of a nuclear device in an urban setting could cause hundreds of thousands of deaths and devastate buildings and physical infrastructure for miles. While not as damaging, a radiological dispersal device could nonetheless cause hundreds of millions of dollars in socioeconomic costs as a large part of a city would have to be evacuated--and possibly remain inaccessible--until an extensive radiological decontamination effort was completed. Accordingly, the GNDA remains our country's principal strategy in protecting the homeland from the consequences of nuclear terrorism. The GNDA is a multi-departmental effort coordinated by DHS's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). DNDO is also responsible for developing, acquiring, and deploying radiation detection equipment to support the efforts of DHS and other federal agencies. Federal efforts to combat nuclear smuggling have largely focused on established ports of entry, such as seaports and land border crossings. However, DNDO has also been examining nuclear detection strategies along other potential pathways and has identified several gaps in the GNDA, including (1) land border areas between ports of entry into the United States; (2) international general aviation; and (3) small maritime craft, such as recreational boats and commercial fishing vessels. Developing strategies, technologies, and resources to address these gaps remains one of the key challenges in deploying the GNDA. Some progress has been made, but DHS and other federal agencies have yet to fully address gaps in the global nuclear detection architecture. Specifically, this testimony discusses DHS's efforts to (1) address our prior recommendations to develop a strategic plan for the GNDA, including developing strategies to prevent smuggling of nuclear or radiological materials via the critical gaps DNDO identified, (2) complete the deployment of radiation detection equipment to scan all cargo and conveyances entering the United States at ports of entry, and (3) develop new technologies to detect nuclear or radioactive materials. This testimony is based on our prior work on U.S. government efforts to detect and prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials issued from October 2002 through September 2010. We updated this information in July 2011 to reflect DHS's efforts to address our prior recommendations by meeting with DNDO officials and reviewing recent DNDO documents, such as the 2010 GNDA Strategic Plan and the 2011 GNDA Joint Annual Interagency Review.

At its Hanford Site in Washington State, the Dept. of Energy (DoE) is responsible for one of the world¿s biggest cleanup projects: the treatment and disposal of about 56 million gallons of radioactive and hazardous waste, stored in 177 underground tanks. Two decades and several halted efforts later, none of this waste has yet been treated, cleanup costs have grown steadily, and prospective cleanup time frames have lengthened. This report assesses: (1) DoE¿s current tank waste cleanup strategy and key technical, legal, and other uncertainties; (2) the extent to which DoE has analyzed whether this strategy is commensurate with risks from the wastes; and (3) opportunities to reduce tank waste cleanup costs. Includes recommend. Charts and tables.

The American Reinvestment Act of 2009 aims to stimulate the economy, including funding for environmental cleanup projects. The Department of Energy (DoE) receives annual appropriations of $6 billion to support the cleanup of radioactive and hazardous wastes resulting from decades of nuclear weapons research and production. This report examined: (1) how DoE selected projects for funding and developed cost and schedule targets; (2) project status and extent to which projects are achieving these targets; and (3) key challenges faced and efforts to address them. The report reviewed Recovery Act project documentation and performance data for 84 projects at 17 sites, and visited the 4 sites receiving most of the funding. Charts and tables.

During the Cold War, the Dept. of Energy (DoE) produced nuclear materials for nuclear weapons at its Savannah River Site (SRS) by dissolving highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel from reactors in a facility known as H-Canyon. DoE planned to end H-Canyon operations in 2007 but now plans to continue H-Canyon operations until 2019 to process additional nuclear material. This report: (1) identifies the types of nuclear materials DoE will process using H-Canyon and its associated costs of operation; (2) determine whether SRS¿s radioactive waste storage tanks and associated nuclear waste facilities are capable of handling the additional waste generated by H-Canyon; and (3) describe H-Canyon¿s compliance with safety and environ. requirements. Illus.

The Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL) has experienced security lapses protecting information on its unclassified computer network. The unclassified network contains sensitive information. This report: (1) assessed the effectiveness of the security controls LANL has in place to protect information transmitted over its unclassified computer network; (2) assessed whether LANL had implemented an information security program for its unclassified network; and (3) examined expenditures to protect LANL¿s unclassified network from FY 2001 through 2007. The author examined security policies and procedures and reviewed the laboratories' access controls for protecting information on the unclassified network. Includes recommendations. Illustrations.

The International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards system has been a cornerstone of U.S. efforts to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation since the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was adopted in 1970. IAEA has strengthened its safeguards system & increased efforts to combat nuclear terrorism by helping countries secure nuclear & radioactive material & facilities. This report: (1) identifies the steps IAEA has taken to strengthen safeguards; (2) assesses the challenges in implementing strengthened safeguards; (3) identifies U.S. financial support for safeguards; & (4) describes IAEA's efforts to help secure nuclear material & facilities. Includes recommendations. Illustrations.

In April 2009, President Obama announced an international initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide within 4 years. Non-proliferation programs administered by the Nat. Nuclear Security Admin. (NNSA) are working to secure nuclear materials in Russia and other countries. This report assessed: (1) U.S. governmentwide efforts to implement the President's 4-year nuclear material security initiative; (2) the status and challenges, if any, of NNSA's nuclear security programs in Russia; and (3) NNSA efforts to secure nuclear materials in countries other than Russia. This report summarizes the findings of the classified report. Charts and tables. This is a print on demand edition of an important, hard-to-find report.

In 2006, a Los Alamos Nat. Lab. (LANL) contract employee unlawfully removed classified information from the lab. This was the latest in a series of high-profile security incidents at LANL spanning almost a decade. LANL conducts research on nuclear weapons and other nat. security areas for the Nat. Nuclear Security Admin. This report: (1) identifies LANL¿s major programs and activities and how much they rely on classified resources; (2) identifies initiatives LANL is taking to reduce and consolidate its classified resources and physical footprints and the extent to which these initiatives address earlier security concerns; and (3) determines whether its new mgmt. approaches will sustain security improvements over the long-term. Illustrations.

The DHS is responsible for addressing the threat of nuclear smuggling. Radiation detection portal monitors are part of the U.S. defense against such threats. Congress required that funds for new advanced spectroscopic portal (ASP) monitors could not be spent until the Sec. of DHS certified that these machines represented a significant increase in operational effectiveness over currently deployed monitors. DHS conducted tests on ASPs to identify areas in which they needed improvement. This report assesses: (1) the degree to which the test report accurately depicts the test results; and (2) the appropriateness of using the test results to determine whether ASPs represent a significant improvement over current radiation detection equipment. Illus.

U.S. nuclear weapons are aging, with key components reaching the end of their service life. In September 2008, the Department of Defense (DoD) and the National Nuclear Security Admin. (NNSA) began a study of military requirements and design options for extending the B61 bomb¿s service life. The B61 supports the U.S. strategic deterrent and NATO. This report assessed the extent to which DoD and NNSA have: (1) considered the time available to begin producing refurbished bombs when determining the scope of the study; and (2) taken actions to avoid operational gaps in U.S. nuclear weapons commitments to NATO during the life extension program. Includes recommend. Illus. This is a print on demand report.