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The recent events found in the occasion of banking crises make the urgent acknowledgement of the need to implement integration and/or modification to the current procedural forms for credit supervision. Indeed, the analysis of the limits of credit supervision urges to a “change of pace” that has to lead to the introduction of crucial changes in supervisory action.Within a social-economic context marked by complexity, research must be oriented towards the identification of the factors that allow the starting of a process that leads to an innovative redefinition of the organizational models of reference. The intention to clarify the actual delimitation of the operational areas currently granted to the national supervisory authority firstly implies that the national supervisory authority will in future avoid proposing a «self-referential» approach, a modus operandi which certainly prevents the objective of ensuring a «fair and prudent management» of the sector in a manner appropriate to its institutional duties. The difficult way of clarifying and simplifying the evaluation processes that are necessary to ascertain possible banking crises must be subordinate to a preventive action of the policy.Considering these events, politics, scholars and policymakers should ask about the possible “drift” which must be avoided. What to do? To accept the present without forgetting the past, from which to draw adequate lessons for the start of a new path that aims to achieve a balanced composition between the cur-rent instability of the system. Perhaps this is the correct methodological approach that can help Italy get out of the difficulties with which, unfortunately, it is currently struggling!

Starting out from the current crisis which has affected the intermediaries-clients relationship and caused a massive litigation in the banking and financial sector, particularly in the Italian judicial system, this paper sets out to examine the normative framework of the Banking and Financial Arbitrator (A.B.F.). Specifically, the A.B.F. should pursue the aims of fair and impartial dispute resolution in line with the judicial character ascribable to decision-making by that body. However, the Bank of Italy is given the task of defining the composition and organisation of the organs of the Banking and Financial Arbitrator; a closer examination of the rules suggests that there are plenty of room for intervention by the Supervisory Authority with regard to the A.B.F. investigation procedure. It is evident as a result that there is a plausible risk of functionalisation of the activity carried out by the A.B.F. for purposes other that and different from those referable to aims of justice.

The recent financial and sovereign debt crisis, while turning the spotlight into the degenerating effects of modern-day capitalism, has engendered a series of hard-to-control events that are severely testing the stability of the European institutions. The adjustments, to date, have proved unable to adequately tackle the financial turmoil that is undermining the construction of the EU. Hence the need to identify the reasons behind this situation, which is accompanied by the failure to achieve an osmosis between the member countries of the Union. The objective to be pursued is clarifying the uncertainties and contradictions within Europe, for the purpose of addressing what many see as a “systemic crisis”.

The results of the Italian political elections occurred on March 2018 have shown insecure majorities in the Parliament, with consequent difficulties in the formation of a national government. Therefore, it is likely that implementation of economic development programs will be significantly more challenging as well as the solution of certain endemic Italian ills (such as unemployment, social inequality, poverty). Such circumstance clearly preludes to the decline of politics, occurring, albeit in different ways, in many States of the EU. It seems that the conditions now permit a change in the evolutionary processes of the economics (also due to the “financialization” of the systems), previously characterized by a bi-univocal relationship with the politics. Economics has acquired a peculiar role in definition of the organizational models through which the political power operates, even if, within the European Union, the bureaucratic-regulatory dimension is still prevailing, according to the traditional intergovernmental pattern. Therefore, a new path for the Europe seems depending on a rearrangement of the relationship between politics and the economy.

A key element for underst ...

Financial crisis has shown that banks and markets cannot always be trusted to deliver what is good for society, since the pursuit of the private interest has proven to be greatly misaligned with the pursuit of the common good. This paper sets out tentative suggestions for reforming the present regulatory framework by making banking foundations accountable for the management of their participations in banks. The analysis concerns both the evolution of the banking foundations, both the questions regarding the foundations' modus operandi and their implications with politics. In fact, the activity of banking foundations is able to bring potential distortions in the financial sector, according to the intention to use the banking 'to buy' the political consensus, without taking care of moral conflicts. Although a conclusive finding cannot be made yet, it is possible that the implementation of an effective normative reform could be valid option for holding banking foundations responsible.

Failures of the corporate governance of banking firms were one of the major causes of the 2007-09 Great Financial Crisis. Various reforms have been enacted to ameliorate Governance standards, notably risk management and incentive systems; but the key driver remains the improvement of shareholders rights, with a view to ensuring sustainable value creation. Instead, in this paper it is argued that, to strive for a structural advance in the risk appetite framework of the banking firm, the fundamental assumption behind corporate governance - i.e. that the ultimate authority lies in shareholders (the “owners”) who detain exclusive voting rights - should be reconsidered. To start with, it is recalled that, according to the options enterprise model, the effective owners of a corporation can be identified with its debt holders. More specifically and more recently, in the case of banking firms, the bail-in/resolution mechanisms enacted create new obligations and responsibilities for holders of subordinated debt: accordingly, the traditional corporate governance framework should be modified to allow - in appropriate forms - for their voting rights and presence in the Board of Directors/Supervisory Board.