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Contains three articles examining various aspects of military aid to civilians. Addresses the categorization of conflict, lessons in command and control learned from the Los Angeles riots, and military involvement in the drug war. Charts and tables.

More than a century ago, the English philosopher F.H. Bradley wrote that "appearance leaves the world more glorious, if we feel it is a show of some fuller splendour; but the sensuous curtain is a deception ... if it hides some colourless movement of atoms, some ... unearthly ballet of bloodless categories."[28] Eight years into the post-Cold War era, we have a deeper appreciation for the "fuller splendour" of the complete range of military operations. Our strategic environment is complex and chaotic, an environment that routinely frustrates the strictures of bloodless categories. This frustration will not cause us to resist the impulse to categorical thinking. Indeed, in times of chaos and complexity, nothing is more instinctive. But categorization brings consequences. We ignore the logical channeling and predispositions derived from our categorizations of conflict at great risk. The proposed revision of FM 100-5 attempts to strike a balance, categorizing our operations according to purpose, while acknowledging that only agile, flexible combinations of these categories can meet the complete range of strategic requirements. Is this about right? Let the debate begin.

To understand the phenomena of 'war' or 'operations other than war, ' we must view them in their context of conflict. The dominant academic views such as realism, rationalism, or idealism present partial perspectives of conflict; these views are of limited utility to practitioners who must deal with conflict in an environment of increasing volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity. A general theory of conflict would expedite communication and coordination between the diverse efforts of the many agencies of conflict. An outline of a general theory of conflict starts with conflict as the competition of contradictory ideas. The mechanism of conflict is two-fold: logic and violence. The milieu of conflict includes chance, fog, friction and circumstance. Circumstance in turn includes geography, resources, technology and history. This outline of a general theory of conflict can be evaluated in light of Paret's three roles for theory; cognitive, utilitarian, and pedagogic. The cognitive test is applied to generate an improved understanding of the conflict in Bosnia. The utilitarian test is applied to test the usefulness of the theory in matters of current strategy: the conflict environment, the use of force, and the National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. The pedagogic test is applied to analyze the future and the Revolution of Military Affairs.

Several theoretical and doctrinal problems limit current US Army understanding of conflict, war and operational art. Those problems include confusion between conflict and war, ambiguity of theoretical terms such as 'center of gravity' or 'culminating point, ' and difficulty in describing the mechanism through which operational art links tactical successes to strategic aims. The premise of this monograph is that several of these problems can be attributed to a failure to understand war as a subset of conflict. The monograph attempts to outline a theoretical model of operational art as an aspect of conflict rather than of war. The theoretical relationship of conflict, war and operational art is presented using a 'structure' analogy. Conflict theory is the foundation of the doctrinal structure. The structure itself encompasses both war and warfare ('actions short of war'). Operational art is a structural framework necessary for success in both war and warfare. The model has implications for our understanding of the role of ideas in conflict and war. It provides insights into 'actions short of war.' It suggests some potential deficiencies in the concepts and organization of our current doctrine of operational art. The model also demonstrates the critical consequences of theory for our understanding of war and operational art.

Alte Sünden werfen lange Schatten Amos Decker, der Memory Man, besucht seine Heimatstadt, als plötzlich ein alter Bekannter vor ihm steht. Meryl Hawkins ist ein verurteilter vierfacher Mörder und der Erste, den Decker als junger Polizist hinter Gitter gebracht hat. Hawkins, der aufgrund seines schlechten Gesundheitszustandes vorzeitig entlassen wurde, beteuert seine Unschuld. Sein letzter Wunsch: der FBI-Ermittler soll seinen Namen reinwaschen. Kurz darauf wird Hawkins erschossen. Nun kommen Decker echte Zweifel: Hat er dabei geholfen, den Falschen zu bestrafen? Als er den Fall wieder aufrollt wird klar: Jemand wird weiter töten, um ein altes Geheimnis zu verbergen . . .

The memoir of David Lubbock.