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This reports finds that the Coalition Government has developed in public a more mature and measured relationship with the US, although there has been no fundamental change in the nature of the tie. The Committee declares the relationship to be in good health. In particular, the Committee said that it was not aware of any evidence that the House of Commons vote in August 2013 against potential military action in Syria had damaged the UK's relationship with the US. Rather, the Committee concluded that the episode illustrated general features of the UK-US relationship, namely that developments in the UK could influence US policy; and that the underlying tie was resilient. Today's publication follows up a report produced by the previous Foreign Affairs Committee at the end of the last Parliament, which recommended that the UK Government should adopt a more hard-headed and less deferential approach to the US. The Coalition Government seemed to have taken up this recommendation. The Committee criticises the UK Government's poor provision of information about the UK-US Joint Strategy Board, which was created during President Obama's State Visit to the UK in May 2011. Among strategic issues that it considered, the Committee agreed with the Government that the proposed EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) could have significant positive strategic impact for the UK and the transatlantic relationship.

The creation of this Privy Council Review was announced on 25 July 2007 "to advise on whether a regime to allow the use of intercepted material in court can be devised that facilitates bringing cases to trial while meeting the overriding imperative to safeguard national security". All bodies and individuals that met with or provided evidence to the Review were in favour in principle of intercept as evidence. But there were very different views as to whether national security could be safeguarded effectively. The Review endorses the principles that: there is an overriding imperative to safeguard national security; all trials must be (and be seen to be) procedurally fair; the State should wherever possible prosecute those it believes are involved in terrorism or other serious crimes; in any criminal prosecution the best available evidence should be made available in court. The report examines: current use of intercept; potential use and benefit of intercept as evidence; risks; resource implications; new communications technology; relevance of experiences of other countries; legal models. The Review concludes that intercept as evidence should be introduced. It believes that it would be possible to provide for the use of intercept as evidence in criminal trials in England and Wales by developing a robust legal model, based in statute and compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. A model - PII Plus (PII = Public Interest Immunity) - is suggested as the basis, and the Review outlines further preparatory work and confidence-building measures necessary to develop a detailed regime.

This paper analyses the UK's approach to identifying and managing threats to the national security of the UK, and the implications for these arrangements of a vote for independence. It complements analysis of the UK's approach to defence explored elsewhere in the Scotland analysis series. It is clearly in the UK's interests to be surrounded by secure and resilient neighbouring countries, including - in the event of a yes vote - an independent Scottish state. While the UK endeavours to work with other countries and international organisations to improve security and fight organised crime for everyone's mutual benefit there is something qualitatively different about being influential and intimately connected with the rest of the UK by being a part of it. Issues of national security are of the utmost sensitivity, linked to a country's foreign, security and defence policy posture, and any decisions are closely related to matters of sovereignty and democratic accountability. For this reason, a security union is closely connected to the existence of a political union. The creation of an independent Scottish state would see an end to the current arrangements for ensuring Scotland's security, as Scotland, including Police Scotland, would no longer be part of the UK's national security infrastructure and capabilities. In practical terms this means that the present level of strategic and operational communication and co-ordination that occurs everyday across the UK, with Scotland playing a key role within it - whether concerned with counter-terrorism, fighting serious and organised crime or protecting against cyber threats - would end

A chronological listing of the text of all public general acts issued during the year, with notes and annotations. "Current law statute citator" section cumulates with each issue during the year. Multi-year cumulation available separately as: Current law statute citator (1947-1971) and: Current law legislation citator (1972- ).

Incorporating HCP 1085, session 2005-06 and HCP 96, session 2006-07, not previously published

The Committees report examines whether the Government presented accurate and complete information to Parliament in the period leading up to the war in Iraq, particularly regarding Iraqs possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Committee finds that Ministers did not mislead Parliament, and that on the basis of the evidence available to the Committee, Alastair Campbell did not exert improper influence on the inclusion of the 45 minutes claim (the time it would take Iraq to deploy WMD) within the September intelligence dossier, as has been alleged. Detailed conclusions reached include: i) the 45 minutes claim did not warrant the prominence given to it, (because it was based on a single, uncorroborated source); ii) the Government should explain why the claim was given such prominence and whether it still considers this to be accurate, in the light of subsequent events; iii) it was wrong for Alastair Campbell or any unelected Special Adviser to have chaired a meeting on an intelligence matter, and it is recommended that this practice cease; iv) the February dodgy dossier was counter-productive and undermined the credibility of the Governments case, and it was fundamentally wrong to allow such a document to be presented to Parliament and made widely available without ministerial oversight; v) the Government should be prepared, on principle, to accede to intelligence requests from the Foreign Affairs Committee, where its importance to an inquiry can be demonstrated, unless there are genuine concerns for national security. In cases where this is refused, the Government should give its full reasons for doing so. Ultimately, the continuing concerns about the WMD claims are unlikely to be dispelled unless more evidence of Iraqs WMD programmes comes to light.