Search

Well-functioning risk-sharing arrangements are essential for the shock absorbing capacity and resilience of an economy, even more so for countries in a monetary union where the single monetary policy is unable to address asymmetric shocks. The common shocks that euro area member states have been facing over the past years are just that: common. Yet their impacts are far from equal across countries, implying that risk sharing remains an important issue. This paper discusses the different forms and channels of risk sharing and reviews the main arguments in favour and against the development of different forms of public and private risk sharing in the euro area, focusing in particular on whether they act as complements or substitutes. It proposes a stylised theoretical model of a monetary union to test the complementarity or substitutability between public and private risk sharing. While the model calibration finds that substitutability prevails, the model also contains an interesting complementarity whereby a central fiscal capacity makes private risk sharing more efficient, especially in crisis times. Our findings are relevant for the ongoing policy discussion on EMU deepening as the provision of public risk sharing as well as the overall degree of risk sharing are still comparatively low in the euro area.

This paper builds a quarterly Divisia monetary aggregate for the euro area using area-wide data over the sample period from 1980 to 2000, finding two main results. First, it is found that the demand for this monetary aggregate has been well behaved and relatively stable over the last two decades. Secondly, the Divisia-weighed monetary aggregate is found to have interesting information content from a forward-looking perspective. This lends support to the view that money and - in a broader sense - liquidity services should be assigned an important role in shaping monetary policy in the euro area, although the policy maker is not interested in monetary aggregates.

This paper presents a dynamic general equilibrium model with sticky prices, in which "inside" money, made out of commercial banks' liabilities, plays an active, structural role role. It is shown that, in such a model, an inside money shock has a well-defined meaning. A calibrated version of the model is shown to generate small, but non-negligible effects of inside money shocks on output and inflation. I also simulate the effect of a banking crisis in the model. Moreover, I find that it is optimal for monetary policy to react to such shocks, although reacting to inflation alone does not result in a significant welfare loss.

We study the role and the interaction of the quality of institutions and of counter-cyclical policies in leaning against the Global Financial Cycle (GFC) in Emerging Economies (EMEs). We show that heteroegeneity in institutional strength is a key determinant of the different effects of the GFC on EME domestic financial conditions. Institutional strength also shapes the response in terms of counter-cyclical policies to sudden changes in global financial conditions as well as the effectiveness of such policies. We illustrate in a simple stylised model that countries may in fact decide to undertake ex ante costly structural reforms that reduce their vulnerability to the GFC or react ex post to the financial s hock. However, we also find that the Covid-19 episode seems to deviate somewhat from the general pattern of EME reaction to shifts in the GFC.