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This is the first report from the House of Commons Reform Committee of the 2009-10 session (HCP 372), and follows an earlier report (HCP 1117, session 2008-09). The Committee aims to make the Commons matter more, increase its vitality and rebalance its relationship with the executive, and to give the public a greater voice in parliamentary proceedings. In the first two chapters the Committee sets out the wider background to its establishment in July 2009; seeks a prompt debate and decision on its proposals and their phased implementation; and describes the principles that have guided its work. The Committee recommends that the Chairs of departmental and similar select committees be directly elected by secret ballot of the House using the alternative vote. The Committee also recommends that members of departmental and similar committees should be elected from within party groups by secret ballot, and further recommends: (a) a reduction in the size of a standard departmental committee to not more than 11; (b) a Standing Order ensuring the election of members and Chairs of select committees within six weeks of the Queen's Speech; (c) the election by the House of the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee.The report looks at the prospects for some form of "agenda initiative" which might enable the public to ensure that a given issue is debated in the House. It concludes that opening up the process of legislation and giving the public a real opportunity to influence the content of draft laws should be a priority in the new Parliament.

The Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) was established under the Intelligence Services Act 1994 to examine the expenditure, administration and policy of the UK's three intelligence and security agencies, namely the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). The ISC members are appointed by, and report directly to, the Prime Minister. This report covers the period May 2002 to April 2003 which has seen increasing pressure on intelligence and security resources in the wake of the Al-Qaida attacks on September 11 2001, the Bali bombings in October 2002 and events in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as other terrorist threats, the counter-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and anti-drugs work.

The report examines whether the available intelligence that informed the decision to invade Iraq was adequate and properly assessed, and whether it was accurately reflected in Government publications. The report covers several topics. (1) Assessments between 1990 and September 2002. The Committee accepts that there was convincing evidence that Iraq had active chemical, biological and nuclear programmes after 1990, all prohibited by United Nations Security Council resolutions, but there was no firm intelligence about the exact nature and extent of any weapons. The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) assessment of 9 September 2002 is viewed as a balanced assessment of scenarios, but it does not highlight in the key judgements the uncertainties and gaps in the UK's knowledge about the chemical and biological weapons (CBW). (2) The 24 September 2002 dossier. The Committee has examined the drafts of the dossier. It finds that the final draft was toned down from an earlier one, that the JIC had not been subjected to political pressures, and that the dossier was not "sexed-up" by Alastair Campbell or anyone else. Text highlighting that Saddam was not considered a current or imminent threat to the UK mainland was not, the Committee regrets, included in the published document, nor was there a sufficiently balanced view of Saddam's chemical and biological capacity. The claim that WMDs could be ready for use in 45 minutes was not placed in context, and it should have been explained that this referred to battlefield chemical and biological munitions and their movement on the battlefield. The concerns about the dossier raised by some members of the Defence Intelligence Service were not communicated to the chairman of the JIC or the Defence Secretary: the Committee recommends that this should happen in future. (3) Assessments October 2002 to March 2003. Assessments whilst the UN inspectors were in Iraq were that Saddam was continuing to retain and conceal Iraq's proscribed weapons programmes, and that he would use CBW if attacked. The presence of the inspectors would have inhibited the programmes to some extent, but this was not reflected in the assessments, nor in the February 2003 dossier. (4) The February 2003 dossier. This was designed to present further evidence of Iraqi concealment, but as it contained information that was not assessed by the intelligence agencies, including an unattrributed research article, it attracted publicity that detracted from the purpose of the dossier. (5) Annexes. The report also contains two annexes: a briefing note on the influence of the Iraqi intelligence and security services; and the Committee's comments on the Foreign Affairs Committee report (HCP 813-I, session 2002-02, ISBN 0215011627)

The purpose of the inquiry was to consider whether the UK intelligence and security Agencies had any knowledge or involvement in rendition operations and their policy for intelligence sharing with foreign liaison services in this context. It looks at the legal framework, the nature of intelligence sharing, the changes since 9/11, ethical dilemmas, flights through UK airspace, and specific cases. One of the conclusions is: "What the rendition programme has shown is that in what it refers to as the 'war on terror' the US will take whatever action it deems necessary, within US law... Although the US may take note of UK protests and concerns, this does not appear to materially affect its strategy on rendition. It is to the credit of our Agencies that they have now managed to adapt their procedures of work round these problems and maintain the exchange of intelligence... The committee notes that UK Agencies now have a policy in place to minimise the risk of their actions inadvertently leading to renditions, torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (CIDT). Where it is known that the consequence of dealing with a foreign liaison service will include torture of CIDT the operation will not be authorised."

This report makes recommendations to improve the process by which Members learn and develop their careers. If implemented the recommendations would mean: extending the period between a General Election and the date of first sitting, to allow for a longer period of induction; allocating part of most question times to topical questions; extra debates on topical matters on a weekly basis; shorter debates on most general issues and some legislation; a weekly half-hour slot for debating Select Committee Reports; more comprehensible motions; shorter speeches; greater flexibility on time limits on speeches; and the reintroduction, on a trial basis, of Private Members' Motions in Westminster Hall.

The House of Lords Constitution Committee have today published their 4th report of the 2009-10 session on 'The Cabinet Office and the Centre of Government' (HLP 30, ISBN 9780108459320) in which they suggest that power within the cabinet has become increasingly centralised to the Prime Minister and recommend that structures of accountability should be reformed to mirror that change. The Committee expresses support for the principles of collective responsibility but recognise that increasingly the Cabinet Office has become responsible for overseeing the delivery of government policy across departments. They stress that accountability mechanisms within the UK constitution are not set up to reflect this new reality with parliamentary and select committee scrutiny based on individual Ministers reporting to Parliament for activities within their departments. The Committee also considers the role of the Minister for the Cabinet Office, and state that the responsibilities of the post are currently poorly defined. They recommend that the Government reassess the functions of the Minister for the Cabinet Office to ensure that the postholder's responsibilities accurately reflect the strategic role the Cabinet Office plays in delivering government policy. The report goes on to consider the approach taken to changes to the machinery of government and the change in the role and function of the Lord Chancellor which took place during Tony Blair's time as Prime Minister. The Committee states that the process of change involved ’wholly inadequate' consultation both within government and with the senior judiciary, and further states that there was "no justification for failure to consult on these important reforms". The Committee recommends that in future the Cabinet Office should play a formal role in investigating any machinery of government changes, particularly those with constitutional implications.

Published in association with Great Britains Cabinet Office, the Civil Service Yearbook is a one-stop reference tool for anybody working in, dealing with, or interested in any aspect of Great Britains Civil Service. It provides full details of all central and devolved government, their contact details, responsibilities and key staff; comprehensive details of all executive agencies and non-departmental public bodies and their affiliations; details of a wide range of related organizations, including museums, galleries, libraries, and research establishments; and improved research aids to make sure that this information is even more accessible than before.

In June 2012, the Government published its Communications Data draft Bill (ISBN 9780101835923). The Bill is intended to ensure that the police and other public bodies continue to be able to access communications data. The Committee believes, in respect of communications data, that there is a serious problem that requires action. That intelligence and security Agencies require access to communications data in certain tightly controlled circumstances and with appropriate authorisation, in the interests of national security. With changing technologies, such Agencies are unable to access all the communications data they need and the Committee believes that updating the current arrangements governing retention of communications data offers the most appropriate way forward. For the draft Bill, more thought needs to be given to the level of detail, in particular in relation to the Order-making power, but Parliament and the public will require more information to be convinced. Further, in respect of the draft Bill, there seems to have been insufficient consultation with the Communication Service Providers on practical implementation, as well as a lack of coherent communication about the way in which communications data is used and the safeguards that will be in place.