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Empirical results highlight the downside of imposing certain regulatory restrictions on commercial bank activities. Regulations that restrict banks' ability to engage in securities activities and to own nonfinancial firms are closely associated with more instability in the banking sector, and keeping commercial banks from engaging in investment banking, insurance, and real estate activities does not appear to produce positive benefits.

No grand solution appears to exist for the problems that seem inevitable in the Argentine system, in which the Central Bank is both lender of last resort and currency board, providing full convertibility between pesos and U.S. dollars. Argentina's strategy therefore must turn on actively strengthening its banking systems to reduce solvency risks and on building its reserves.Within the current rules of the game, Argentina's central bank (BCRA) is charged with being the lender of last resort as well as providing full convertibility between pesos and U.S. dollars - two objectives with one instrument, namely, reserves. Within those rules, it may well be that the balance of responsibilities needs to shift. Complete dollarization can significantly reduce risks but not entirely eliminate them. If the BCRA can concentrate more on building up reserves and helping to ward off crises of confidence in the currency, perhaps the banking system can protect itself better from liquidity shocks. But this will require, among other things, consolidation of the sector (which could give it greater access to outside liquidity) and prudential strengthening of the system. Triage of weaker banks should continue and not await another crisis.More experience with the new liquidity policy is needed and so is reform of the settlement system, as it affects the functioning of the interbank market, which is essential for containing crises. Essentially, however, no grand solution seems to exist for the problems that seem inevitable in a system where the central bank is also the currency board. Argentina's strategy must therefore turn on actively strengthening its banking systems to reduce the risks of insolvency.This paper - a product of the Finance and Private Sector Development Division, Policy Research Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to advise member countries on financial sector policy.

September 1996 No grand solution appears to exist for the problems that seem inevitable in the Argentine system, in which the Central Bank is both lender of last resort and currency board, providing full convertibility between pesos and U.S. dollars. Argentina's strategy therefore must turn on actively strengthening its banking systems to reduce solvency risks and on building its reserves. Within the current rules of the game, Argentina's central bank (BCRA) is charged with being the lender of last resort as well as providing full convertibility between pesos and U.S. dollars -- two objectives with one instrument, namely, reserves. Within those rules, it may well be that the balance of responsibilities needs to shift. Complete dollarization can significantly reduce risks but not entirely eliminate them. If the BCRA can concentrate more on building up reserves and helping to ward off crises of confidence in the currency, perhaps the banking system can protect itself better from liquidity shocks. But this will require, among other things, consolidation of the sector (which could give it greater access to outside liquidity) and prudential strengthening of the system. Triage of weaker banks should continue and not await another crisis. More experience with the new liquidity policy is needed and so is reform of the settlement system, as it affects the functioning of the interbank market, which is essential for containing crises. Essentially, however, no grand solution seems to exist for the problems that seem inevitable in a system where the central bank is also the currency board. Argentina's strategy must therefore turn on actively strengthening its banking systems to reduce the risks of insolvency. This paper -- a product of the Finance and Private Sector Development Division, Policy Research Department -- is part of a larger effort in the department to advise member countries on financial sector policy.

Cross-border banking, while having the potential for a more efficient financial sector, also creates potential challenges for bank supervisors and regulators. It requires cooperation by regulatory authorities across jurisdictions and a clear delineation of authority and responsibility. That delineation is typically not present and regulatory authorities often have significantly different incentives to respond when cross-border-active banks encounter difficulties. Most of these issues have only begun to be seriously evaluated. This volume, one of the first attempts to address these issues, brings together experts and regulators from different countries. The wide range of topics discussed include: the current landscape of cross-border bank activity, the resulting competitive implications, emerging challenges for prudential regulation, safety net concerns, failure resolution issues, and the potential future evolution of international banking. This book has been selected for coverage in: . OCo Index to Social Sciences & Humanities Proceedings- (ISSHP- / ISI Proceedings). OCo Index to Social Sciences & Humanities Proceedings (ISSHP CDROM version/ISI Proceedings). Sample Chapter(s). Chapter 1: Cross-Border Banking: Forces Driving Change and Resulting Regulatory Challenges (363 KB). Contents: Special Addresses: Cross-Border Banking: Forces Driving Change and Resulting Regulatory Challenges (M H Moskow); Cross-Border Banking and the Challenges Faced by Host Country Authorities (G Ortiz); Survey of the Current Landscape: Risks in US Bank International Exposures (N Cetorelli & L S Goldberg); Cross-Border Banking in Asia: Basel II and Other Prudential Issues (S Hohl et al.); Competitive Implications: Competitive Implications of Cross-Border Banking (S Claessens); Bank Concentration and Credit Volatility (A Micco & U Panizza); Prudential Regulation Issues: Home and Host Supervisors' Relations from a Host Supervisor's Perspective (P Bednarski & G Bielicki); Basel II Home Host Issues (P Jackson); Market Discipline Issues: Confronting Divergent Interests in Cross-Country Regulatory Arrangements (E J Kane); Market Discipline Issues Associated with Cross-Border Banking (D D Evanoff); Safety Net Issues: The Lender of Last Resort in the European Single Financial Market (G J Schinasi & P G Teixeira); Payment Systems and the Safety Net: The Role of Central Bank Money and Oversight (J Stehm); Insolvency Resolution Issues: Banking in a Changing World: Issues and Questions in the Resolution of Cross-Border Banks (M Krimminger); Bank Insolvency Procedures as Foundation for Market Discipline (A Angkinand & C Wihlborg); Policy Panel: Where to from Here?: Comments on Cross-Border Banking: Regulatory Challenges (C Calari); Designing the Home-Host Relationship to Support in Good Times and Bad: Trans-Tasman Developments (A Orr); and other papers. Readership: Professors teaching financial institutions, banking, financial regulation, or international financial markets; research economists interested in financial markets and institutions; financial regulators and policy-makers; financial consultants with internationally active customers."