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Since 2016, the European Union has developed a number of new initiatives on security and defence. In particular, the introduction of Permanent Structured Cooperation and the European Defence Fund have been designed to allow the EU to become a more autonomous actor with regard to crisis management, capacity building and protecting Europe and its citizens. Yet the development of these new initiatives raises questions about their overall coherence and the role of parliamentary scrutiny. It is necessary to analyse the role of the European Parliament and national parliaments in relation to the scrutiny of the European Defence Fund. There is a need for recommendations on how parliamentary scrutiny can be enhanced at the EU level in the area of security and defence.

The 2009 adoption of the EU directive on intra-Community transfers of defence equipment ('ICT directive') (2009/43/EC) aims to harmonize defence transfer licencing in the EU. The directive is part of a 'defence package' - along with a directive on defence procurement (2009/81/EC) - that is geared to liberalizing and regulating the European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM). A major theoretical question is why the EU Member States would agree to the ICT directive when it did not ultimately make much difference to the functioning of the EDEM. A number of competing theories exist that help explain why the 2009 'defence package' was adopted. In the hope of engaging with this theoretical debate, and expanding our empirical understanding of the ICT directive, this article contends that insights from judicial politics, economic patriotism and liberal intergovernmentalism are best placed to explain why the EU Member States eventually adopted the directive.

Elaborating on the likely form and extent of PeSCo, this Chaillot Paper not only sketches out the historical metamorphosis of PeSCo but it also looks more specifically at how it could change the operational and capability development dynamics of EU defence cooperation. The paper is not primarily occupied with questions about its finalité politique, but it is rather an analytical guide to assist experts and lay readers alike navigate the major operational and capability issues at stake.

The South Mediterranean region has considerable endowments in natural gas, oil, iron ore, phosphates, steel, wood extracts, zinc and fisheries, as well as for Mediterranean agriculture products. Daniel FIOTT would like to see this potential translated into something he would call 'resource-full revolutions'. Specific initiatives would include a Euro-Med Energy Community, bearing in mind the experience of the EU in extending its energy policies into south-east Europe, which places an important emphasis on harmonization of the regulatory environment. He refers also to the Mediterranean Solar Plan of the Union for the Mediterranean, and the intentions of the EU to conclude new trade liberalization agreements for fisheries and agriculture. At the G20 level there were attempts this year to advance commodity policies, such as with the new Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS), which FAO is entrusted to develop, but these remain to prove their value.

Hybrid threats - unconventional threats that fall under the threshold of military force - have become an ubiquitous feature of today's security environment. Although the EU is much better placed to detect and combat hybrid threats today than was the case five years ago, this new form of asymmetric conflict remains a major challenge. This Chaillot Paper seeks to provide practical and operational insights on how the EU can best respond to and counter hybrid threats. It focuses on three key policy domains that are of vital significance in a hybrid context - borders, critical infrastructure and disinformation - and shows how the EU has developed specific strategies to combat hybrid challenges in these areas. The paper underlines the importance of developing an overarching strategic response, and of improving coordinated EU approaches to hybrid threats.