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This collection of four plays offers students the means to enter the world of imagination and to bring words to life in front of an audience. Confidence is enhanced and new skills are developed as they inhabit characters, interact with others and deliver lines in front of an audience.

We measure the response of physicians to monetary incentives using matched administrative and time-use data on specialists from Québec (Canada). These physicians were paid fee-for-service contracts and supplied a number of different services. We model physician behaviour and derive a conditional earnings function that returns the maximum earnings a physician can generate in the labour market, conditional on total hours worked. The earnings function is estimated using both limitedinformation methods and full-information methods. Limited-information methods impose fewer restrictions on the data, but are less informative over incentive effects. Le Chatelier effects imply that they identify lower bounds to the own-price substitution effects. Full-information methods explain earnings and hours simultaneously. They identify the full response to incentives, including income effects. Our results confirm that physicians respond to financial incentives. The own-price substitution effects of a relative price change are both economically and statistically significant. Income effects are present, but are overridden when prices are increased for individual services. They are more prominent in the presence of broad-based fee increases. In such cases, the income effect empirically dominates the substitution effect, which leads physicians to reduce their supply of services.

We measure the response of physicians to monetary incentives using matched administrative and time-use data on specialists from Québec (Canada). These physicians were paid fee-for-service contracts and supplied a number of different services. Our sample covers a period during which the Québec government changed the prices paid for clinical services. We apply these data to a multitasking model of physician labour supply, measuring two distinct responses. The first is the labour-supply response of physicians to broad-based fee increases. The second is the response to changes in the relative prices of individual services. Our results confirm that physicians respond to incentives in predictable ways. The own-price substitution effects of a relative price change are both economically and statistically significant. Income effects are present, but are overridden when prices are increased for individual services. They are more prominent in the presence of broad-based fee increases. In such cases, the income effect empirically dominates the substitution effet, which leads physicians to reduce their supply of clinical services.

We develop and estimate an agency model of worker behavior under piece rates and fixed wages. The model implies optimal decision rules for the firm's choice of a compensation system as a function of working conditions. Our model also implies an upper and lower bound to the incentive effect (the productivity gain realized by paying workers piece rates rather than fixed wages) that can be estimated using regression methods. Using daily productivity data collected from the payroll records of a British Columbia tree-planting firm, we estimate these bounds to be an 8.8 and a 60.4 percent increase in productivity. Structural estimation, which accounts for the firm?s optimal choice of a compensation system, suggests that incentives caused a 22.6 percent increase in productivity. However, only part of this increase represents valuable output because workers respond to incentives, in part, by reducing quality.

This paper uses data on the wages received by piece-rate workers to estimate worker productivity profiles. The data were collected from the payroll records of a British Columbia copper mine. The advantage of these data is the close link between observed wages and worker productivity. An explicit model is used to control for worker effort as a function of observable worker characteristics and the parameters of the compensation system. The model implies a censored wage distribution, the parameters of which can be estimated using well-known econometric techniques. Semi-parametric estimation allows for the relaxation of the distributional assumptions of the model. Results suggest that while productivity profiles were increasing concave functions of tenure, they were also very flat. I relate these results to historical arguments on the skill-saving nature of technological change in the mining industry at the end of the nineteenth century.

Poetry Anthology