Gamble in the Coral Sea

The Gamble in the Coral Sea is the first comprehensive account of the Battle of the Coral Sea from the Japanese perspective. It is a result of 10 years of research on Japanese primary and secondary sources about the clash between the US Navy and Nippon Kaigun that changed the course of the war in the South Pacific. The Japanese plan to seize Port Morseby in early May 1942 was a direct thrust to Australia and New Zealand, which could be cut off from American support and be at the mercy of the enemy. By committing three carriers, including famous Shōkaku and Zuikaku, the Nippon Kaigun's command risked killing the bird with one stone right before the envisaged decisive battle in the Central Pacific, scheduled for early Jule. The venture into the South Pacific was considered a vital part of the Japanese war strategy and an excellent opportunity to train the unseasoned aircrews. Operation MO was supposed to be another victorious campaign that extended the Japanese perimeter far into the enemy's territory.

The US Navy's ability to read the part of the opponent's plan and decision to make a stand led to the first aircraft carrier battle in history. Surprisingly, it was rich in unexpected events and mistakes that both sides could have avoided if they had experienced carrier warfare. The overly complicated and optimistic Operation MO plan, elaborated by Admiral Shigeyoshi Inoue, the Commander in Chief of the Fourth Fleet, contributed to the loss of the first Japanese carrier, the Ryūjō, on 7 May. The MO Kidō Butai, led by Rear Admiral Takeo Takagi as an operational commander, and Rear Admiral Chūichi Hara, the commander of the 5th Kōkū Sentai and the officer responsible for air operations, had a unique chance to prove their value and destroy Rear Admiral Frank Fletcher's TF-17 centred around the Lexington and the Yorktown. The indecisiveness and bad calls made by the Japanese commanders and aircrews put the MO Kidō Butai against the wall, which had to resolve the battle on 8 May if they still dreamed about seizing Port Moresby. However, the main carrier clash proved to be a pyrrhic victory for the Japanese, who sunk the Lexington and crippled the Yorktown but were forced to call off Operation MO due to the mauled Shōkaku and the severe losses in the aircrews. The book aims to present the circumstances and actual reasons for the Japanese failure and the revised impact of the battle of the Coral Sea on the battle of the Midway.