The Failure of Mill's Qualitative Distinction of Pleasures

By Thi Thu Huong Dang

The Failure of Mill's Qualitative Distinction of Pleasures
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Essay from the year 2008 in the subject Philosophy - Philosophy of the 19th Century, grade: Not yet graded, LUISS Guido Carli (LUISS Guido Carli), course: Applied Ethics, 28 entries in the bibliography, language: English, abstract: In reply to the standing objection that utilitarianism is a pig philosophy, John Stuart Mill (1806 - 1873) holds that Benthamite utilitarians "have fully proved their case" (II, 4) by pursuing quantitative hedonism which emphasizes the difference of quantity in pleasures . However, he still aims at taking a "higher ground, with entire consistency" (II, 4) to defend utilitarianism by introducing his later-called qualitative hedonism that is based on the difference of quality in pleasures in Chapter II of Utilitarianism. In the essay, I argue that Mill's qualitative distinction of pleasures is problematic and inconsistent with hedonism, to which he explicitly commits himself. As a result, instead of providing support for utilitarianism, it causes more problems.

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